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Abstract 
This paper argues that some of the patterns seen in aphasia may reflect difficulties in 
the cognitive preparations for language.  In particular, some individuals may be 
unable to carry out processes of ‘Thinking for Speaking’ (Slobin 1996), which frame 
thoughts for language production.  Evidence to support this proposal is presented, 
together with signs that such thinking can be assisted with cues and therapy.  It is 
argued that these preliminary data need to be pursued via a more comprehensive 
investigation of thinking therapy.    
 
What this Paper Adds 
In order to express our ideas we need to frame them in ways that are compatible with 
language.  For example, we have to adopt a particular perspective, or chose what to 
highlight and what to omit.  Such cognition has been termed ‘Thinking for Speaking’ 
(Slobin 1996).  Some of the patterns seen in aphasia, such as the typical advantage of 
nouns over verbs, may be due to difficulties with this type of cognition.  This paper 
offers evidence to support this proposal.  Preliminary data are also presented 
suggesting that Thinking for Speaking can be cued.  In conclusion, it is argued that we 
need to pay more attention to the cognitive preparations for language when carrying 
out aphasia therapy.   
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It is a truth (almost) universally acknowledged that people with aphasia are not 
intellectually impaired.  Rather they have a specific language disorder in the face of 
generally intact cognition.  The evidence for this leaps out from any interaction with 
an aphasic person.  As an example, here is a conversation between myself and RS.  R 
had aphasia following a stroke in his early 40s.  Before this he ran his own business, 
which he was now selling: 
 
J   Can you tell me how far you have got with selling your   
  business R? 
R  er ………… Mr N  (Mrs S: Your accountant) 
R  Yes … I’ve left it to him 
J  And how far has he got with it? 
R er … one chap has come up with a er ……… fee … but there’s three 
more coming 
J  That’s quite good isn’t it?  Are they offers that you can   
  accept? 
R  Not really 
J  So you want slightly more? 
R  Yes 
J  How quickly do you want to sell it? 
R As soon as possible … just for me to …. call it a day …. but it could 
take as long as three months 
J  What will you do with the capital? 
R  Put it into the …… one in the …. What’s name …… bank 
J  What’s happening to the staff? 
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R  er …….. (waves)  goodbye … goodbye 
(taken from: Marshall, 1989) 
 
R was clearly following the negotiations around selling his business. He was oriented 
for time, e.g. knowing that the sale could take months, and was able to judge the value 
of the offers.  R also had some cunning strategies for coping with his aphasic word 
finding difficulties.  He substituted a close alternative for a blocked word (‘fee’ for 
offer) and used a gesture coupled with ‘goodbye’ to communicate the notion of 
redundancies. 
 
We don’t just have to use our observations here.  There is plenty of more scientific 
evidence.  Take the study by Varley and colleagues (2005). They tested 3 people with 
severe aphasia who were virtually unable to speak and had language comprehension 
problems, particularly with sentences.  They also showed difficulties with number 
words, at least in terms of production.  Despite this, they could carry out eye watering 
numerical calculations such as:   
 
50 – [(4+7) x 4) = ? 
2 x [(5 x 2) + 10] = ? 
36 ÷ (3 x 2) = ?  
 
The individuals could even do a ‘bracket generation task’.  Here they were presented 
with a string of digits and mathematical symbols, which they had to mark up with 
different sets of brackets, then calculate the result.  In case anyone is still in doubt, 
there is also evidence that aphasic people can do algebra (Klessinger, Szczerbinski 
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and Varley, 2007) and Theory of Mind tasks, which involve speculation about other 
people’s beliefs (Siegal and Varley, 2006). 
 
Given these data, a defining characteristic of aphasia seems to be a problem in 
mapping intact ideas onto a defective language mechanism.  Put more simply, aphasic 
people can think perfectly well, but have great difficulty expressing those thoughts, 
e.g. because they cannot access words or construct sentences.   
 
Yet are the difficulties purely at the language end of the process?   We know that in 
aphasia certain types of language can be easier than others.  Here are some common 
patterns: 
 
 Automatic, formulaic language, such as social chit chat, serial speech or 
swearing, is often relatively preserved, or at least more so than propositional 
language (Van Lancker Sidtis and Postman, 2006). 
 
 Concrete language is often more intact than abstract, both for production 
(Franklin, Howard and Patterson, 1995) and comprehension (Franklin, 
Howard and Patterson, 1994; Franklin, Turner, Lambon Ralph, Morris and 
Bailey,  1996).   
 
 Nouns are often easier than verbs (e.g. Berndt, Mitchum, Haendiges and 
Sandson, 1997; Breedin, Saffran and Schwartz, 1998; Bastiaanse and Jonkers, 
1998; Edwards and Bastiaanse, 1998; Webster, Morris and Franklin, 2005; see 
also Druks, 2002, for review).  There are also differences within the verb 
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class, in that verbs taking multiple arguments can be particularly problematic 
(Thompson, Lange, Schneider and Shapiro, 1997; Kim and Thompson, 2000; 
McCann and Edwards, 2001). 
 
Why do these patterns emerge?  A number of factors almost certainly play a role.  For 
example, automatic language is often constructed from highly frequent words, which 
may contribute to its availability in aphasia.  Another factor is age of acquisition, 
whereby language that is learnt early in life is more resistant to damage than language 
that is learnt late (Hirsh and Ellis, 1994).  This may help to explain the concreteness 
effect, although it is perhaps less explanatory in the case of automatic language and 
word class.   It also needs to be acknowledged that the patterns although common are 
not universal, and may even be inverted.  RG, for example, showed a preference for 
abstract over concrete words and for verbs over nouns (Marshall, Pring, Chiat and 
Robson 1996; Marshall, Chiat, Robson and Pring 1996). 
 
Despite these caveats, I would like to consider another explanation for these very 
typical patterns.  It could be that production in aphasia, to some extent, depends upon 
the ‘cognitive labour’ involved in translating thoughts into language. So at the easiest 
end of the continuum is language that is highly automatic and barely mediated by 
cognition at all – as is the case for swearing, reciting numbers or trotting out social 
phrases.  Producing words that correspond in a very direct manner with their 
referents, as is the case for concrete nouns, is also relatively straight forward.   
 
Abstract language, on the other hand, requires much more cognitive mediation.  Take 
the following sentence: 
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‘The Head Teacher heard about the trouble during break and asked staff to 
identify the offenders’ 
 
Here we have moved away from simple labelling.  People are referred to by their job 
(‘Head Teacher’, ‘staff’) or in terms of their role in the event and our consequent 
reaction to them (‘offenders’).  That event has been abstracted as ‘trouble’ (was it a 
fight, stealing, drug taking, sexual shenanigans or what?).  Finally we are told that 
staff have to ‘identify’ the children involved.  Again the abstract verb gives us no 
indication of how they will do this – interrogation, CTV evidence or an identity 
parade?  Overall this account is clearly the product of some vigorous cognitive 
filtering, a process that is reflected in the abstract terminology used. 
 
What about verbs?  On the face of it simple action verbs label events in a fairly one to 
one fashion, with none of the abstraction seen with the school incident.  Yet this is not 
the case.  We can illustrate this with the event shown in Figure 1. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
Despite its concrete nature this event can be construed in a number of ways.  To take 
just two of the available options, we might focus on what the man is doing with the 
boxes or the effect on the van.  Each of these construals will map onto different verb 
and sentence options.  So if the focus is on the movement of the box verbs like ‘lift’ 
and ‘carry’ will be selected that map theme onto the direct object; whereas if the 
effect on the van is focussed verbs like ‘fill’ will be used that map goal onto direct 
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object.  Even if the same verb is selected, subtle differences in focus can result in 
subtle shifts in mapping, as these sentences illustrate: 
 
The man loads the lorry with boxes (implies that lorry is full) 
The man loads the boxes into the lorry (implies that the lorry may not be full) 
 
It seems that even a simple action requires considerable selectivity and cognitive 
mediation before it can be described.  This takes our thinking away from real world 
imagery towards the abstracted and pared down structures that map readily onto 
language.  Here is how Pinker puts it in his recent book: 
 
‘when I think about a typical scenario in everyday life, like putting water into a glass, 
my mind has a well fleshed out image – a thirsty person walking over to a faucet with 
a clear tumbler in hand and turning a tap to let water flow into it just short of 
overflowing.  Yet when I talk about the scenario, most of this flesh melts away, 
leaving behind one of several skeletons.  If I use the verb pour, my field of vision 
narrows to how the water is caused to move, ignoring its destination; that’s the reason 
we can say pour the water but not pour the glass.  But if I use the verb fill my field of 
vision narrows to the fullness of the glass, ignoring the trajectory of the water; that’s 
why we say fill the glass but not fill the water’  (Pinker 2007; p 112 – 3) 
 
Pinker argues that whenever we set out to describe an event we have to apply some 
rather specialised forms of thinking, a process that has been termed ‘Thinking for 
Speaking’ (Slobin, 1996).  This thinking re-casts our general thoughts into forms that 
are compatible with language.  As already suggested, it entails processes of 
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perspective taking and selectivity, whereby we home in on some features of the event 
or situation while back-grounding others.  Levelt (1989; 1999) argues that it also 
requires us to build propositional structure, or to delineate the main referents in the 
event and the relationships between them.  We need additionally to ensure that these 
referents correspond with lexical concepts.  Depending on the language that we plan 
to use there will be further demands.  For example, a speaker of a tense marking 
language such as English will need to specify the temporal properties of the event. 
 
This last point underlines a further property of Thinking for Speaking.  It is not 
language independent.  Rather, the way in which we frame our thoughts for language 
must pay attention to the particular requirements of the language that we plan to use.  
Imagine that we are describing an event in which a man takes a stanley knife to a 
sheet of paper.  In English we can describe this event as ‘cutting’ and so discard the 
specific manner and instrument information.  This option is less available to users of 
British Sign Language (BSL), where the verb is marked for instrument.  So there is a 
different verb for cutting with a knife, as opposed to cutting with scissors.  Thus 
people who use BSL have to pay much more attention to instruments than people who 
use English.  In line with this there is some evidence that BSL users are indeed more 
likely to categorise events along instrumental lines than speakers of English 
(Vigliocco, Vinson, Woolfe, Dye and Woll, 2005). 
 
So why is this relevant to people with aphasia?  If language is underpinned by 
specialised, linguistically sensitive cognition, that cognition could be a site of 
impairment.  The loss of access to language will further impact upon the problem, in 
that it will make it difficult to frame ideas in ways that are language compatible.  
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Returning to the example in Figure 1, it is difficult to know which perspective to 
adopt when describing a loading event unless we know about the perspectives 
available in our verb lexicon.  Without access to this information a vicious circle may 
be established whereby impaired access to the lexicon deprives us of the very 
conceptual constraints that make lexical access possible.  This is not to say that 
aphasic people are, after all, intellectually impaired, far from it.  Rather some of their 
problems may reside at the boundary between thought and language, including at the 
thinking end of that boundary (see similar arguments in Dipper, Black and Brian, 
2005) 
 
By now you will be wanting evidence for this. We need evidence that this form of 
cognition has psychological reality. We also need evidence that it can be impaired in 
aphasia. 
 
The study by Kita and Ozyurek (2003) offers evidence that the way that we frame 
ideas for speaking, and indeed gesturing, is linguistically sensitive.  They asked 
speakers of English, Japanese and Turkish to describe a series of cartoon events.  
They were interested in whether their co-speech gestures would reveal subtle 
differences in the way these speakers thought about the events and, in particular, 
whether those differences reflected the specific demands of the 3 languages.  In one 
event a cat attempts to catch a bird by swinging between high buildings on a rope.  
This event is interesting because neither Turkish nor Japanese have a verb 
corresponding to the English verb ‘swing’.  Speakers of these languages, therefore, 
are likely to ignore the trajectory of the motion when describing the event.  Sure 
enough, their descriptions employed verbs equivalent to ‘go’, ‘fly’ and ‘jump’, 
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whereas virtually all the English speakers used ‘swing’.  Intriguingly, these 
differences also manifested in their gestures.  English speakers who gestured 
overwhelmingly used arc gestures in isolation, with fewer than 10% employing 
straight gestures.  In contrast, 70% of the Japanese and 50% of the Turkish speakers 
used straight gestures, and very often these occurred in isolation.  It seemed that these 
speakers had filtered out the arc nature of the movement from their representation of 
this event, so much so that this was even eliminated from their gesture.   
 
So what about aphasia?  Is there any evidence that this form of cognition can be 
impaired?  Some of the evidence is rather circumstantial.  The noun>verb effect is an 
example, as is the evidence that the number of arguments commanded by a verb can 
affect production (Thompson et al, 1997; Kim and Thompson, 2000; McCann and 
Edwards, 2001).  As already discussed, this is in line with the proposal that verbs 
involve more cognitive mediation than concrete nouns.  Those which entail multiple 
arguments describe more complex relationships than those with just one or two, 
which raises the cognitive bar even further.  
 
Another manifestation may be a feature that we have termed ‘hyper-naming’.  We 
have observed that some people with aphasia tend to list often rather extraneous 
nouns when they are attempting to describe events.  Indeed their noun production far 
exceeds that of control participants when carrying out the same task (Marshall, Pring 
and Chiat, 1993; Cairns, Marshall, Cairns, and Dipper, 2007).  Figure 2 gives an 
example.  Here ‘Ron’, a man with non-fluent aphasia, is describing an everyday event 
in which a fairy sprays a swimmer with a hose: 
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Insert Figure 2 here + caption 
 
Rather than homing in on the main event Ron seems to circle it with ever increasing 
object detail.  It is as if he is unable to plump for a focussed perspective that would at 
least give him a chance of verb selection. 
 
While suggestive, the above evidence is far from conclusive.  Verb impairments in 
aphasia arise for many different reasons (see arguments in Marshall 2003).  Problems 
with Thinking for Speaking may be just one contributory factor, and one that only 
applies in some cases.  Similarly, a tendency to hyper-name may point to problems of 
focus, or a desire on the part of the aphasic speaker to reveal an aspect of language 
that is relatively unscathed.   
 
Such difficulties have motivated more direct attempts to explore the cognitive 
underpinnings for language (e.g. Dipper 1999).  One such attempt involves a task 
called the Role Video (Marshall et al 1993). This requires the person to make 
judgements about the roles played by participants in various videoed events, with 
judgements signalled by photo selections.  So, in one item, the video shows a woman 
shooting a man (the event is very obviously staged!). The photos for selection are: the 
man dead on the ground (target), the woman dead on the ground (reversal distractor) 
and the man wearing a coat (event distractor).   Three non-brain injured controls were 
tested, with none making any errors.  However, MM (Marshall et al 1993) made five.  
Her problems were not general.  Rather they occurred with reversible items, where 
one person does something to another, and involved the selection of the reversal 
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distractor.  It seemed that, for her, the processing of event roles was insecure, which, 
in turn, made it difficult to express role information in language. 
 
There is, of course, a catch with tasks like the Role Video.  The specialist cognition 
that we are concerned with occurs only in the run up to language.  Yet these tasks 
have necessarily floated away from that environment.  So, when probing the person’s 
knowledge of event roles we had to use a rather contrived task that was disconnected 
from language production.  It could be argued, therefore, that such tests explore 
general cognition rather than the particular cognitive preparations for language.   
 
Cairns (2006) attempted to circumvent this problem though novel tasks that entailed 
an element of language production.  In one such task she asked people to gesture 
action pictures either silently, or immediately after a verb was produced.  Cairns 
hypothesised that gestures produced after a verb might be less complex than those 
produced silently, because now Thinking for Speaking had taken place.  In other 
words gestures would reflect the discarding of real world detail that necessarily occurs 
during such thinking.  A further question was whether similar paring down would be 
observed in a speaker with aphasia.   
 
The experiment involved 10 controls and Ron, the aphasic person who described the 
fairy picture above.  Ron was tested because he was hypothesised to have problems 
with thinking for speaking.  He had difficulties with verb production and made errors 
on tasks designed to test event processing, such as the Role Video, on which he 
scored 27/32. 
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Each participant had to gesture 40 actions in three conditions.  In the first condition 
this was done silently from a picture.  Then, at least a week later, the pictures were 
presented again and the person was asked to name the verb and gesture the picture 
(condition 2). Finally the person was asked to produce a gesture purely in response to 
a given spoken verb (condition 3). Complexity of the gestures was determined by 
ratings collected from 11 people who were blind to the purpose of the experiment.  In 
a separate procedure two raters also coded the gestures qualitatively, i.e. for how they 
communicated the nature of the event. 
 
Figure 3 here 
 
Let’s take the control data first.  Figure3 shows that the complexity ratings were very 
much in line with the prediction, in that once a verb was produced, either by the 
participant or the examiner, gestures became less elaborate.  A one factor ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of condition (F (2,18) = 7.47, p <0.01), with 
planned comparisons showing that conditions 1 and 2 differed (p<0.01), but not 
conditions 2 and 3.   In other words gesturing in response to a verb and a picture was 
significantly less elaborate than gesturing from a picture alone.  One participant’s 
response to figure 4 exemplifies the point. 
 
Figure 4 here. 
 
When asked to gesture this just from the picture the person mimed a sequence of 
actions:  putting out the tea things, picking up the tea pot, pouring tea into the cup, 
putting the pot down and finally drinking from the cup. Unsurprisingly this was given 
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a whopping complexity rating of 7.  When this person had to first label the event with 
a verb much of this detail melted away.  Now he simply mimed picking up the pot, 
pouring and putting it down again, an effort that gained a measly rating of 2. 
 
Ron’s results were rather different.  First of all his ratings in all conditions were 
higher than the controls’, indicating that his gestures were more elaborate.  It was also 
difficult to interpret his performance in condition 2, where he was required to name 
the verb and gesture the picture, since his attempts at verb production were often 
unsuccessful.  Figure 5, therefore, presents his scores for conditions 1 and 3 only, with 
comparative control data.  This shows that in condition 3, when the verb was 
provided, his gestures were no less complex than when they were produced purely in 
response to pictures.  There was another qualitative difference in his gestures.  Ron 
often outlined the objects involved in the actions (for example, he might outline the 
shape of the teapot when gesturing figure 4) a strategy that was virtually never used 
by the controls. 
 
Insert Figure 5 here 
 
What does this mean?  In the case of the controls it seemed that their thinking about 
the events became more constrained and stripped of real world detail once a verb was 
produced and that, as a result, the complexity of their gestures went down.  Ron on 
the other hand showed less of this effect.  While not wishing to over-interpret, it could 
be that Ron finds it difficult to constrain his thinking in the way that is needed for 
verb selection.  His use of outlining in gesture may offer another clue.  This suggests 
that Ron is focussing, perhaps excessively, on the objects involved in the pictured 
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events, rather than the actions associated with those objects.  Once again, his thinking 
seems to be out of kilter with the controls’ and taking him in directions away from 
verb selection. 
 
So far I have argued that, although general cognition is intact in aphasia, and often 
strikingly so, the specialist cognition that frames thoughts for language may not be.  If 
this is right, then one goal of therapy could be to help aphasic people think about 
situations and events in a way that makes them communicable.  In particular, some 
people with aphasia may need help in formulating the cognitive specifications needed 
for verbs. 
 
How might this be done?  Cairns and colleagues explored one possible cueing task 
called the Sharon and Paul Test (Cairns 2006; Cairns, Marshall and Dipper, in 
preparation).  In this task participants had to label video events with a single verb.  
The stimuli exploited perspective dilemma situations which can be described from 
alternative points of view.  An example would be a scene in which a man legs it down 
the garden, hotly pursued by an irate woman.  This can be described by any number of 
verbs.  But an obvious dilemma is whether to focus on the man, resulting in verbs like 
‘run away’ and ‘flee’, or on the woman, resulting in verbs like ‘chase’ and ‘pursue’.  
Making perspective decisions such as these is one of the tasks involved in thinking for 
speaking, a task that may be particularly problematic for people with aphasia.  In line 
with this there are a number of accounts in the literature of individuals who seem to 
have impaired access to verb perspective information (Byng, 1988; Marshall, Chiat 
and Pring, 1997). 
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The main aim of the Cairns et al study was to find out if aphasic people could be 
helped to make perspective decisions, with the hypothesis that if they could more 
verbs should be forthcoming.  Two types of help were explored.  One involved 
manipulations of filming in such a way that one of the perspective options was given 
far greater visual prominence than the other.  So in the chase/flee example one 
presentation focussed on the unfortunate Paul, while the other zoomed in on the 
fearsome Sharon. 
 
The next level of help re-presented the manipulated films, this time accompanied by a 
sentence frame cue.  So, for the chase/flee example the person saw one film focussing 
on Sharon and heard ‘Sharon (buzz) Paul’.  Elsewhere in the test they saw a different 
film, focussing on Paul, and heard ‘Paul (buzz) from Sharon’.   In line with previous 
research (Fisher, Hall, Rakowitz and Gleitman, 1994) it was hypothesised that these 
sentence cues would act like a ‘zoom lens’ on the event, removing all ambiguity as to 
the perspective being adopted.   
 
Of course, one problem with this task is that the person being tested sees the same 
events over and over again, albeit with slightly different presentations.  If their verb 
access improves, therefore, it could simply be due to practice.  To investigate this 
possibility a 4th condition was administered which re-presented the original neutral 
stimuli.  If these were named less successfully than the intervening cued conditions 
we can dismiss practice as the source of change. 
 
So, to summarise, the experiment had 4 conditions:  (1) Neutral; (2) Perspective Cues 
(manipulated films); (3) Perspective + Language Cues (manipulated films 
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accompanied by a sentence frame); (4) Repeated Neutral.  In each condition the task 
was the same. The person watched the film and had to produce a single verb to say 
what happened.  There were 19 items in the neutral conditions and 38 in the cued (i.e. 
here there were 2 presentations per event, each taking the alternative perspective).  Of 
interest was whether aphasic verb production would increase in the cued conditions.  
If it did, this would suggest that these conditions helped the person to make the 
perspective decisions needed for verb access.   
 
The task was carried out with 20 healthy controls and 6 people with aphasia, one of 
whom was Ron whom we met above.  The aphasic participants all had impaired verb 
production in the face of much better access to nouns.  They also had difficulties with 
verb and sentence comprehension, especially when reversible sentences were 
involved.   
 
Unsurprisingly, the controls found the task easy.  There were only 2 occasions when a 
control failed to produce a verb, out of a possible 2280 responses.  The range of verbs 
produced was high, in line with the proposal that these stimuli offer multiple 
perspective options.  For example, across all controls and all conditions the chase/flee 
items elicited 12 different verbs (assault, attack, chase, escape, fight, flee, hit, pursue, 
quarrel, retreat, run, threaten).   
 
The wide range of control responses encouraged us to adopt liberal scoring criteria 
when evaluating the aphasic data.  Accordingly a response was judged to be correct if 
it: 
 fell within the control inventory for that item 
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 was a synonym of a control verb for that item (as listed in the New Oxford 
Thesaurus of English, 2000)  
 was judged correct by a naïve external rater, who was blind to the purpose of 
the experiment 
 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
 
Using these criteria, figure 6 shows the mean number of correct verbs that the aphasic 
people produced in each condition (expressed as a percentage of the total).  You can 
see that the cued conditions did indeed raise verb access, although most markedly in 
the perspective + language condition.  The fact that production drops down again in 
the 2nd Neutral condition (this condition scored lower than both the cued conditions) 
suggests that our participants were not simply benefiting from practice. Rather we like 
to think that our cues helped them to organise their focus on these events and so kick 
start access to the verb lexicon. 
 
Figure 6 makes it clear that the aphasic participants were helped most by cues that 
combined the perspective manipulation with language.  It is difficult to know how 
these cues worked.  It is possible that they simply functioned like a sentence 
completion task.  However, for six of the items the language cue comprised just one 
or two words.  For example, the verb ‘fall’ was cued with ‘Paul (buzz)’.  Yet these 
very minimal cues, which simply highlighted the agent, were as helpful as those that 
supplied more syntactic and semantic information, such as ‘Paul (buzz) a radio to 
Sharon’.  While only suggestive, this observation may indicate that the cues did in 
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fact help primarily by constraining perspective.  In other words they may have offered 
an anchoring point from which the event could be described. 
 
Although the direction of the results was in line with our predictions the size of the 
effect was very small.  You can see that even the best condition (perspective + 
language) only raised verb production by just over 10% compared to the first neutral 
condition.  However, although small this difference was significant (Wilcoxson 
signed ranks test, T = 0, p <0.025).  It is also important to remember that here 
participants were responding purely to a ‘one off’ cue.  We think, therefore, that our 
optimism is justified.  If we can get a small but significant result from cues, what 
might we get from therapy? 
 
This question has largely gone unanswered.  An exception is our study with MM 
(Marshall et al 1993; and see Marshall and Cairns 2005).  She had agrammatic speech 
in which verbs were almost entirely absent.  There were also problems with her 
comprehension of verbs and sentences.   
 
There were signs that MM’s problems with verbs might originate, in part, with a 
difficulty in framing her thoughts for language.  She was an exponent of hyper-
naming and made errors on tasks designed to test event concepts, such as the Role 
Video.  We therefore embarked on a programme of event therapy.  This was heavily 
influenced by Jones’s work with BB, which posed a series of questions about written 
sentences (Jones 1986).  So BB was given a sentence and asked first to identify the 
verb, then the person carrying out the action and the object or person affected by it.  
Our questions were similar, but revolved around the event itself.  So MM was shown 
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a video of an event and asked questions about who was responsible for it, what was 
changed or moved, and the nature of the action.  The therapy differed from Jones’s 
original mapping therapy in that the stimuli comprised videos of events, rather than 
sentences, and all the questions could be answered non verbally, e.g. by selecting a 
photo of the people carrying out the different roles or by gesturing the action.   
 
This therapy had some positive benefits, in that MM became more able to describe 
pictured events.  She produced more verbs and more word order structure after 
therapy than before and her production became more comprehensible to observers.  
So, for example, observers who knew MM could comprehend 26/50 of her picture 
descriptions after therapy, compared to just 13/50 before; and there was a similar gain 
for observers who were not familiar with her (7/50 pre therapy vs 19/50 post therapy).  
However, this skill was limited to simple events, involving no more than 2 
participants.  The moment she was asked to describe multiple events or events 
involving more people her production broke down.  Possibly related to this was the 
fact that her spontaneous speech showed no signs of change. 
 
So where do we need to go next?  We need to develop and investigate a full blown 
programme of thinking therapy.  This will build upon the cueing and therapy tasks 
described in Cairns et al (in preparation) and Marshall et al (1993).  So, therapy 
stimuli will comprise films of events that are manipulated to help the person make 
perspective decisions.  In addition to the manipulations already described we need to 
explore ‘zooming in’ devices, e.g. to help the person identify the agent over other 
participants, or eliminate peripheral detail from complex scenes.   
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These events will be presented for description, with a hierarchy of cues.  Initially cues 
will comprise the sentence frames of the type employed in the Sharon and Paul Test. 
They will then progress to more minimal cues, eg consisting of just the first word.  
Therapy will also involve role decision tasks, e.g. where the person has to identify the 
agent, theme and other entities in the event.  A range of therapy stimuli need to be 
developed, progressing from very simple events, (e.g. where a single person acts upon 
an object), to more complex (e.g. where a man feeds a child at a table while listening 
to his wife, who is also cooking the dinner).  A further development might experiment 
with distant modes of delivery, so that face to face therapy can be supplemented with 
self administered practice.  Finally, conversation partners should be involved, e.g. so 
that they are trained to ask the sort of questions that help the aphasic person to frame 
their thoughts for language.   
 
If the hypothesis presented in this paper is correct, such therapy should help at least 
some aphasic individuals to communicate events and relational ideas more 
successfully.  This should be marked by gains in verb production and word order, but 
may also manifest in more structured and effective use of non verbal devices like 
gesture.  Most importantly effects need to be evaluated not just with clinical tasks, but 
also via tasks that mimic real language, such as conveying gossip and explaining why 
a 15 year old is not allowed to stay out till 4am.   
 
This paper has argued that aphasic people, despite having generally intact cognition, 
may have difficulties in the conceptual preparations for language.  Such difficulties 
may account for some of the patterns that we see in aphasia, such as the Noun>Verb 
effect and greater ability to use concrete rather than abstract language.  They may also 
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be uncovered by specific investigations, such as the Role Video (Marshall et al 1993) 
and the gesture task developed by Cairns (2006).   If this view is correct then our 
therapy needs to take more account of the thinking that occurs just before speaking.  
Indeed there is some evidence that this thinking may be helped by cues (Cairns et al, 
in preparation) and therapy (Marshall et al, 1993).  We now need to act upon these 
hints and investigate a fully fledged programme of thinking therapy. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2:   
 
 
 
 
 
Ron’s Description:  ‘tap, hose, and pixies, elf, woman, long hair – no, short – no, bob, 
and pixie and then swimming woman, and cap, obviously, and (gestures goggles)’ 
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Figure 3:  Mean Complexity Ratings of Controls’ Gestures 
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Figure 4:  An example stimulus from the gesture task 
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Figure 5: Mean complexity ratings of gestures produced by Ron and Controls in 
response to pictures and verbs 
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Figure 6:  Mean % of Verbs Produced by Participants with Aphasia in the Sharon and 
Paul Test 
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